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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 19-2559 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  SYLVESTER ANDREWS,  
 also known as Kazime, 
    Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(Related to E.D. Pa. Crim. No. 2-92-cr-00671-008) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
July 25, 2019 
 
Before:  JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR. and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 3, 2019) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Sylvester Andrews has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus requesting that we 
direct the District Court to rule on a motion to reduce sentence that he filed pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) and the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194.  
For the reasons that follow, we will deny the mandamus petition. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Andrews is a federal inmate who was convicted of various drug and firearms 
offenses.  In January 2019, he raised First Step Act claims in an amended motion to 
vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  The District Court, with Andrews’ consent, 
construed that filing as a motion to reduce sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) and 
ordered the government to respond.  On March 13, 2019, the District Court stayed the 
motion pursuant to a February 4, 2019 standing order of the Chief Judge of the District 
Court.  That order established a committee of representatives from the United States 
Attorney’s Office, Federal Defenders Association, and Probation Office to review the 
files of defendants who may be eligible for sentence reductions under the First Step Act 
and to prioritize the cases of eligible defendants.  The order also stayed, for 90 days, all 
motions to reduce sentence based on the First Step Act. 
On May 3, 2019, Andrews filed a motion in the District Court seeking an 
expedited ruling on his pro se motion to reduce sentence.  The motion indicated that he 
did not wish to be represented by counsel.  Andrews maintained that the Federal 
Defenders Association had not shown sufficient enthusiasm for his First Step Act claims.   
On May 16, 2019, the Federal Community Defender Office for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania sent Andrews a letter informing him that the government would not 
agree to a sentence reduction in his case.  The letter stated that although the mandatory 
minimum applicable to Andrews’ conviction had changed pursuant to the First Step Act, 
his sentence was based on a guidelines calculation that exceeded and was not controlled 
by the applicable mandatory minimum.  That said, the letter also indicated that the 
Federal Community Defender Office would file, with Andrews’ consent, a motion to 
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reduce sentence that raised his First Step Act claims.  The Federal Community Defender 
Office estimated that it could file the motion sometime in June 2019. 
Andrews has not indicated whether he consented to the Federal Community 
Defender Office’s filing a motion in support of his First Step Act claims, and, to date, no 
such motion has been filed.  The government has filed its opposition to Andrews’ First 
Step Act claims.  In his mandamus petition, Andrews asks us to direct the District Court 
to rule on his First Step Act claims as presented in his pro se motion to reduce sentence. 
 A writ of mandamus is a drastic remedy available only in extraordinary cases.  See 
In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005).  To obtain 
mandamus relief, a petitioner must show that “(1) no other adequate means exist to attain 
the relief he desires, (2) the party’s right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable, 
and (3) the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.”  Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 
U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Generally, a court’s management of its docket is discretionary, In re Fine Paper 
Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982), and there is no “clear and 
indisputable” right to have the District Court handle a case in a certain manner, see Allied 
Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980).  Although we may issue a writ of 
mandamus when a district court’s “undue delay is tantamount to a failure to exercise 
jurisdiction,” Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996), that situation is not 
present here. 
The District Court has acted well within its discretion to efficiently and 
systematically manage the litigation arising from the First Step Act by appointing a 
4 
 
committee to review the files of defendants, including Andrews, who may be eligible for 
relief.  In addition to those systemic efforts, the District Court has specifically addressed 
Andrews’ First Step Act claims, raised in his motion to reduce sentence, by ordering the 
government to respond.  Andrews did not indicate until May 2019 that he wishes to 
proceed pro se, and we are fully confident that the District Court will address that issue, 
as well as the merits of Andrews’ First Step Act claims, without undue delay.  Thus, we 
cannot say that there has been any undue delay by the District Court, let alone a delay 
that is tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction or that “rise[s] to the level of a 
denial of due process.”  Id.  Accordingly, at this time, the extraordinary remedy of 
mandamus is not warranted, and we will deny Andrews’ mandamus petition. 
